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5 
THE EU, RUSSIA, AND ENERGY SECURITY 
Jonathan Jones 
ABSTRACT 
Recent disputes between Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine regarding natural gas prices 
and transportation have caused several European states to qu estion the reliability and 
security of their imported natural gas suppli es, and the wisdom of their overwhelrning 
reliance on Russia. The question arises , however, as to what viable options are available to 
European countries. Some have proffered the idea of replacing Russian natural gas supplies 
with increased imports of Norwegian or Algerian gas. Other possible options include a more 
con1.prehensive and cooperative European stance toward Russia and the development of 
alternate or renewable energy sources. Although the EU member states depend highly upon 
Russian energy resources, Russia is also highly dependent, economically, upon the EU. The 
EU m arket is extremely important to Russia; both for energy resources and other 
commodities. Russia simply cannot afford to overtly damage that relationship. 
Consequently, a united and cohesive effort in energy diplomacy by the EU would likely be 
strong enough to pressure Russia on certain issues and prevent futu re supply problems. 
Other possible solutio ns, such as diversifying natural gas suppliers and increasing alternate 
energy sources, simply involve too many logistical concerns to be effective solutions. 
Cohesive and united energy diplomacy, however, would necessitate increased policy 
coordination which also presents several problems. Despite these problems, however, it 
remains the best option. 
INTRODUCTION 
T he notion of energy security has played all. increasingly important role in the realm 
of international affairs. The severe oil shocks that followed the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict 
prompted many nations to more seriously consider the security of their energy supply. 
Following the conflict, the importance of energy security became a m aj or priority for the 
developed world and related policies were permanently affixed near the top of the agendas 
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of the world 's major leaders. The inequitable spread of energy resources throughout the 
world has enriched som e states, while leaving others at a crucial disadvantage in economic 
and diplomatic relations. T he wealth of oil and natural gas in the Middle East has produced 
a host of " rentier states," nations almost completely reliant on energy wealth for sustenance. 
T heir we'alth, subsequently, allows them to employ despotic political practices and unions 
between wealthy oil-states afford them the capacity to significantly affect the global market 
price and supply. Conversely, countries devoid of significant energy wealth must often 
endure the price flu ctuations that stem from foreign supply restrictions and expansions. 
In recent years the European Union has fo und itself increasingly dependent on 
fo reign entities, primarily Russia, fo r its energy supplies. Russia is the largest producer of 
natural gas and the second largest p roducer of oil , directing a considerable quanti ty of its 
exported energy supplies into the E U market (Gelb 2007 , 2). R ecent disputes, however, 
between Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine regarding natural gas prices and transportation have 
caused several European states to question the reliability and security of their imported 
natu ral gas supplies. In 2004, a Gas Coordination Group was o rganized by the European 
Union (EP 2004, 95) . The main objective of the gas coordination group was to improve 
network coordination am ong m ember states in the event of a supply disruption. Though the 
group has pelformed adequately in som e instances, it has not demonstrated that it can be 
an effective tool for ensuring a secure and stable energy supply. Several members of the EU 
have also questioned the wisdom of their heavy reliance on Russia to r natural gas. In light 
of the perception of Russia's increasingly "aggressive" fo reign policy and use of energy 
diplomacy, many have suggested that E urope should pursue an alternate course. 
The political impact and economic leverage wielded by Russia on account of 
Europe's increasing dependency m ay harbor potentially dangerous implications to r the 
futu re. C onversely, dependence on ' smaller, more cooperative, and less powerful states , such 
as N orway or Algeria, likely does no t entail the same precarious implications . The stabilizing 
Russian economy coupled with the benefits of the continuously lucrative energy market 
have lessened, though by no m eans eliminated, Russia's need for international finan cial aid . 
As a result, Russia is able to shield itself from international criticisms or disregard them 
entirely (Trenin 2006,94). Furthermore, the increasing dependence of several international 
regions on Russian energy has prornpted some nations to mute their criticisms of Russia's 
qu estio nable human rights record (Economides 2006, 1). T he results, subsequently, are 
watered-down censures that Russia is likely to simply discount o r ignore. The remaining 
critics of the Kremlin 's policy, how ever, have characterized the administrdtion's energy 
tactics as " tools of intimidation and blackm.ail ," meant to reassert Russian influence in the 
former-Soviet sphere (Wagstyl 2006, 1). As Russia seeks to assert itself as an energy 
superpower and promote "Russian national interests ," the prevalence of these tactics and the 
degree of intensity are likely to increase. Furthermore, as energy demands in Europe 
gradually climb, alo ng with their subsequent reliance o n Russian energy, Russia's 
corresponding economic leverage and diplomatic strength will also increase. These recent 
events and the subsequent accusations, although admittedly minor, are indicative of the 
potential leverage of Russian energy supplies in the future. While Russian energy diplomacy 
may, currently, consist only of minimizing criticism , future actio ns nuy include more overt 
pressure and ambitious diplom atic efforts in the broader European sphere. As a result, the 
increasing dependence of the E uropean Union on Russian energy supplies portends an 
omino us European future. 
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The question arises, consequently, as to what viable options are available to the 
European Union. The most common responses have been the propositions asserting that the 
EU diversify its energy suppliers and promo te alternate energy sources. These propositions, 
however, are simply not viable solutions. There are too many obstacles impeding the 
po tential benefits or success of these propositions . R eplacing Russian gas imports entails too 
many overwhelming logistical and legal concerns. Similarly, considerable hurdles, both 
logistical and collaborative, impede the development and implem entation of alternate and 
renewable energy resources . T he m ost promising and viable solution , consequently, is a 
unified and cohesive diplomatic effort. An assertive European diplomacy effort has the 
potential to enhance European energy security and stability and em erges as the m ost fea sible 
option. 
The wealth of literature on the subj ect fo cuses largely on the first two propositions. 
In 2006, the C;:ommission of the European Union published a green paper entitled, "A 
European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy." Amo ng other issues the 
paper dealt with the stability and security of energy supply. T he proposal called for a 
diversification of E urope's energy mix in order to lessen dependence on external suppli ers, 
but allowed each nation to determine their own energy mix (EU Commission 2006, 9) .The 
proposal also discussed the formation o f a coherent, external energy policy (EU 
Conunission 2006, 14). Unfortunately, instead of reinforcing the call fo r a stronger or more 
united diplomatic line with concrete m easures, the proposal offered minor suggestions that 
would do little m ore than maintain the status qu o. T he proposal called for the establishment 
of a new institutional group, the "Strategic EU Energy R eview (EU C omissio n 2006, 14)." 
Though maintaining potential as a future EU forum, the Strategic EU Energy R eview 
would primarily concern itself with infrastructural issues and the evaluatio n of individual 
m ember states (EU C ommission 2006, 15). Furthermore, in regards to external diplomacy, 
the proposal advocates "partnerships" and "dialogue" with energy suppliers (EU 
Conunission 2006, 15) . Additional literature on the subject presents similar proposals, 
advocating continued dialogue with Russia and tempered Russian-EU relati ons (Bahgat 
2006, 976). Since the collapse of the Soviet Unio n in 1991, however, Russia has been 
incorporated into countless dialogues, partnerships, and councils with the EU and individual 
E uropean states. For example, Russia and the EU have held a regular and institutionalized 
energy dialogue fo r the past seven years (Euractiv B 2007) . Continued dialogue and new 
partnerships, consequently, fail to solve the fundamental problem. Russia would likely prefer 
nothing more than to be an established energy partner and secure continued access to 
European markets. A continued, tempered dialogue doesn't impede Russia from practicing 
energy diplomacy, nor does it offer incentives for. Russia to cease doing so. Although, 
purported partnerships and dialogues with Russia have been occurring regularly since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, supply disruptions have still occurred and energy diplomacy 
has increased. 
Energy diplomacy is, by no m eans, an unreasonable or unwarranted Russian strategy. 
Characterized as the use of energy supplies to coerce competing nations and secure political 
advantages in the international community, energy diplomacy is practiced by virtually all 
nations that can m aintain energy advantages. Similarly, resource diplomacy is conUllon 
throughout history and m any nations have sought to exert pressure in the international 
sphere by exploiting resource advantages. In light of Russia's recent history, energy 
diplomacy is likely a wise and profitable tactic. Securing expo rt m arkets fo r their natural gas 
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and influencing prices provides necessary financial reli ef and the desired international 
prestige. Tlus discussion does not seek to criticize Russia for its action . Instead, it seeks to 
evaluate the potential options available to the European Union and deternune wluch of 
those options are comparatively more feasible. 
FEASIBILITY OF SUPPLY DIVERSIFICATION 
In an efiort to reduce the European Union 's potentially dangerous reliance on 
Russian gas, several EU bureaucrats and other European voices have suggested that the EU 
diversify its supply options. This prospect, however, remains unfeasible at best. Russia is 
currently the world 's leading producer and exporter of natural gas, and holds 27% of proven 
natural gas resources. The EU imports 25% of its gas consumption, but the reliance of 
individual member states on Russi~lI1 gas varies greatly (Euractiv B 2007). Germany imports 
39% of its gas supplies trom Gazprom, the state-owned Russian gas monopoly, while Great 
Britain, a significant gas-producer, imports virtually no gas supplies at all (Gelb 2007, 2). 
N ewly-accepted EU m ember countries , previously in the Soviet sphere, are 
overwhelnungly dependent on Russian gas supplies. Former m embers of the USSR, such 
as Estonia and Lithuania , import over 98% of their gas supplies from Russia. France and Italy, 
while not as dependent as Germany, still import 31% and 24% respectively (Gelb 2007 ,2). 
In effect, Russia has, over the past several decades, gradually and successfully claim ed 
significant portions of the European energy market. The extent of their reach into EU 
markets, consequently, makes it difiicult to simply replace Russian gas supplies. 
In addition, logistical concerns complicate the proposal's viability. Russian pipelines 
already extend across the European landscape, with major transit routes running through 
Belarus, Poland, Germany, Ukraine, Slovakia, the Czech R epublic, and Hungary (Bahgat 
2006, 9(9) . N ew pipelines are being planned and, to a lesser degree, being constructed under 
the Baltic Sea and in southern Europe. In contrast, Middle Eastern gas is largely destined for 
the Uluted States and Asian markets, and its transit infrastructure is correspondingly 
designed. Europe does import natural gas from Libya, Qatar, and Iran, and both Spain and 
France import a considerable portion of their natural gas from Algeria through the 
Maghreb-Europe pipeline (EIA 2007) . However, in order to replace or largely supplant 
Russian gas, these transit systems would necessitate substantial upgrades and expansion. The 
necessary infrastructural adjustments would require significant financial investment and 
decades of negotiation, development, and construction. All the while, Russian pipelines 
stand ready and waiting with notable additions and expansions already underway. 
Norway has also been suggested as an alternative to Russia . Norwegian natural gas 
acconU110dates approximately 15% of European gas consumption, and some have suggested 
that Norway has the potential to double its contribution (Ibson 2007, 11). Norwegian gas 
deposits, however, are declining (Bahgat 2006, 9(3). Also, similar to Russian gas imports, 
Norwegian gas is not equally distributed among European nations. Thus, while doubling its 
production may provide brief respite for some Western European nations, it would not be 
able to notably supplant Russian gas in the remaining European countries. Lastly, while 
Norwegian gas deposits are declining, European gas imports are steadily rising, making 
Norway unlikely to replace, even partially, Russian gas imports, unless that import 
dependence is curbed. Hence, an appeal to Norwegian gas is simply not a feasible solution. 
Finally, individual European states have, and are continuing to extend, contractual 
obligations to Russia. In December of 2006, the major French national gas company, Gaz 
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de France, renewed its contract with Gazprom and extended their supply agreernent 
through 2030 (Dempsey 2006, 1). Italian gas giant, Eni, recently completed a similar 
arrangem ent, extending their supply contract with Gazprom until 2035. Germany and 
Russia recently reached an agreement on the Nord Stream pipeline in 2005, contractually 
uniting the two countries until 2010 (Simonian 2006, 5) . RWE Trangas, the Czech 
Republic's major gas distributor, also inked a long term deal with Russia late in 2006, 
renewing their supply contract and extending it to 2035. Diversifying away Russian gas now 
becomes a difficult proposition , faced with varying legal obstructions. Essentially, individual 
European states are simply not endeavoring to reduce their reliance on Gazprom, and 
domestic energy firms have contr.lctually obligated themselves to continued reliance on 
Russian gas imports. While tlus has the potential oflessening the probability offuture supply 
disruptions, it also forces European states to negotiate individually with Russia. Individual 
negotiation with Russia , subsequently, allows Russia to exert considerably more pressure on 
individual states than would be possible in a collective European efiort. Furthermore,Javier 
Solana, the EU head of Foreign Affairs has encouraged EU m ember-states to seek long term 
supply contracts with Russia. Emphasizing the importance of a stable energy supply, Solana 
directed individual member states to make long-term agreements with Gazprom 
(Krawchenko 2006). Solana's entreaty for contractual action breaks the recent EU trends 
calling for diversification of energy supplies, possibly indicating that such trends may be 
ineffective or unfeasible. Thus, while lIlany recogluze the potential dangers of dependence 
o n Russia, efforts to ameliorate these dangers by diversifying supply options and partially 
supplanting Russian gas imports are simply not viable or realistic. 
OBSTACLES TO RENEWABLE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT 
Another oft-proposed solution to the European Union 's energy dilenU11a is the 
employment of alternate energy sources. Specifically, the use of renewable energy sources as 
a means of nutigating dependence on imported fossil fu els. The Comnussion of the 
European Union has recently promulgated an ambitious strategy regarding energy 
conservation and diversificatio n. In January of 2007, the ConU1ussion proposed instituting a 
target of 20% for renewable energy sources in EU energy consumption by 2020. This 
"energy-climate change package" also stipulates EU-wide and compulsory compliance (EU 
Commission 2007, 10-11). The proposition was widely acclaimed by conservationists and 
energy scientists. Furthermo re, research indicates that increasing the use of renewable energy 
sources, such as wind, solar, and biomass, is a realistic option (lEA 2007, 15-18). Despite 
these positive advances, however, alternate energy sources and, specifically, renewable energy 
sources remain a difficult and unfeasible option. Several obstacles impede the institution and 
acluevement of this ambitious initiative. First, the determination of acceptable energy 
sources is disputed. Secondly, the logistics of the proposal present considerable difficulties. 
Lastly, the issue of mandatory compliance is already dissuading current members of the 
European Union. 
The competing states of the European Union currently disagree on which renewable 
energy sources are acceptable. The principal item of discontent is nuclear power. Several EU 
nations, such as France and Slovakia, derive a significant portion of the domestic energy 
supply form nuclear power (WNA 2007). France has since proposed amending the current 
Comnussion proposal to allow the use of nuclear power as an alternative and renewable 
energy source. French ministers contend that EU support of such a policy will increase the 
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use of nuclear technology and allow the EU to reach a higher threshold of renewable energy 
in their energy consumption (Euractiv A 2007). Currently, the European Union derives 
approximately 32% of its energy supply from nuclear power. Nuclear power, however, is an 
unacceptable option to several countries, such as Austria. In Austria, public opinion has 
decidedly opposed nuclear power and the construction of nuclear power plants since 1978. 
As a result , the inclusion of nuclear power as an option for renewable energy sources would 
appease France, but upset Austrian domestic politics. Conversely, wIllIe Austria would 
overwhelmingly support the exclusion of nuclear power in the EU proposal, it would 
simultaneously frustrate French eftorts. The nuclear obstacle and the inability, thus Elr, for 
European countries to agree, presents a clear difficulty in the development of alternate and 
renewable resources. 
The logistics of the proposal also presents several financial and infrastructural 
difficulties for the EU countries. Current EU levels of renewable energy are approximately 
6% of EU energy consumption (lEA 2007, 11). The Commission's proposal to Illore than 
triple the current percentage necessitates an ambitious infrastructural upgrade. The 
technology and apparatus necessary for the large-scale generation of wind and solar power, 
and the production of biomass energy products, are simply not in place. The financial 
considerations are considerable, both for the construction and implementation of these 
programs as well as the necessary research and development. The proposal also requires a 
degree of policy coordination and implementation on a national level that is neither swift 
nor simple. In essence, the logistical hurdles are significant. 
Furthermore, there are procedural disputes among EU members about the process of 
achieving the Commission's target. Among current procedural disputes is the idea of 
bundling (Crooks 2007, 1). Bl1l1~ling essentially involves the control of distribution 
networks for gas and electricity. A "bundled" energy plan allocates control to energy 
suppliers while an "unbundled" plan ofters control to independent companies. The French 
energy minister, Fran<;:ois Loos, recently proposed adopting a system of regulated and 
restricted unbundling, similar to the French model. TIllS was largely rejected by many 
members of the European Union, especially the United Kingdom, which pressed for full 
and complete unbundling (Crooks 2007, 1). These infrastructural and procedural issues, 
consequently, pose a significant problem to the effective development of new European 
energy options. 
Finally, the Commission's energy plan has upset some EU states over its proposal for 
mandatory targets. The proposal sets two specific targets, both for 2020. The first stipulates 
that 20% of the European Union's energy supply must be renewable energy, and the second 
stipulates that 10% of the European Union's transport fuel must be biofuel (EU commission 
2007,10-11). The proposal further posits that the targets should be legally binding with the 
potential for punitive action. Germany has emerged as strong supporter for mandatory 
compliance, recently joined by the United Kingdom after a recent reassessment of security 
policy. However, several other nations, including Poland and France, have pressed for more 
flexibility in the matter (Euractiv c 2007). These attitudes may indicate either a lack of 
conunitment or an air of pessinllsm. In either case, this behavior con1.plicates the potential 
for an increased use of renewable energy in the near future. 
Policy initiatives, regarding energy, are not a new phenomenon in Europe. The last 
fifteen years have witnessed several efforts to induce an increased use of renewable energy. 
Unfortunately, member states have often failed to reach the targets. In 1997, the objective 
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was to increase the percentage of renewable energy in Europe to 12% of overall energy 
consumption by 2010 (EU Commission 1997, 9). Recent evaluations, however, have 
characterized this goal as unattainable. A 21% share of renewable electricity in electricity 
production by 2010 was declared as the goal in 2001 (EP 2001,35). Progress has been more 
favorable in this efiort, but most EU nations are not on track to reach their respective 
national targets. The European's Union continued inability to meet goals has undermined 
international confidence and expectations in their fulfillment, especia]]y when compliance 
is not legally binding. 
The dilemma of European dependence on imported energy supplies remains a 
quandary. The conullonly proposed solutions simply do not offer a feasible resolution of the 
problem. Substituting away from Russian gas proves difficult because of logistical and legal 
concerns. Similarly, efforts to replace Russian gas with renewable energy sources face 
significant procedural and logistical impediments. Aside from these concerns, however, both 
proposals face a timing dilemma. Effective implementation of either policy would 
potentially require decades before they could provide a viable alternative to Russian energy. 
The financial and infrastructural concerns are significant impediments. Consequently, 
neither solution oilers an immediate response to the current situation. However, this does 
not preclude the simultaneous European pursuit of renewable energy sources or efforts at 
supply diversification along with the implementation of an alternative response. While these 
are not feasible short term responses, or viable long term solutions in and of themselves, the 
pursuit and implementation of these policies will likely ameliorate future European energy 
concerns. The Russian-EU energy relationship, however, is a pressing issue for many 
European states and requires a response in the inmlediate future. Furthermore, while the 
European Union 's potential for diversifying its energy mix and promoting alternate energy 
sources will increase in the future, its domestic energy demand will increase as well. 
Research estimates that the European Union wi]] import more than 50% of its natural gas 
from Russia by 2030 (lves 2007). Energy consumption, and, subsequently, energy demand, 
is increasing annually, meaning that the EU must address not only its present concerns, but 
its future concerns as we]]. As a result, the current dilenu11d necessarily calls tor a different 
solution. 
THE CASE FOR DIPLOMACY 
As an organization, the European Union comprises one of the most influential 
economic and political blocs in the world. The organization now includes twenty-seven 
member states and encompasses more than four-hundred and fifty mi]]ion people. 
Diplomatica]]y, the European Union, when it manages to act cohesively, is a daunting foe, 
and has the potential to secure important benefits for itself and its constituents. 
Consequently, because of its considerable influence, the most feasible solution to the Russian 
natural gas dilemma is diplomacy. The most viable and potentia]]y effective solution available 
to the European Union is a united and cohesive diplomatic stance toward Russia. A solid 
and comprehensive policy line from the European Union could influence Russian behavior 
and induce beneficial and desired outcomes. 
The changes in Russian conduct necessitate a change in the European Union's 
relations toward Russia. Russian foreign policy behavior has recently been criticized as 
overly "aggressive" and even " imperialistic (Trenin 2006, 90)." Russia's use of energy 
diplomacy has become increasingly more conm10n as they seek to exploit their 
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international advantage. An effective response to Russian behavior naturally entails an 
element of aggressiveness in the European Union's diplomatic efforts. Individual 
assertiveness, however, is unlikely to be effective against the newly-reenergized Russian 
state. Instead, a cohesive diplomatic effort by the European Union as a whole offers the m ost 
plausible and effective solution. Unlike continued partnerships and dialogues, which 
constitute the bulk of the European Union's diplomatic repertoire, a cohesive and assertive 
diplomatic stance would entail negative and credible consequences tor Russia , should it fail 
to acquiesce. The European Union could, among other options, threaten to restrict 
investment in the Russian energy sector or impede the £low of Russian goods into the 
E uropean market. In any case, the assertive nature of the diplomatic effort would necessitate 
the explici t and credible assertion of negative repercussions in the case of noncompliance. 
Furthermore, such a diplomatic effort would necessarily require cohesion on the part of the 
European Union. Disunity and the failure of individual states to abide by the central 
diplomatic position would undermine the European diplomatic effort and afford Russia the 
opportunity to avoid negative repercussions throu gh bilateral negotiations. N aturally, 
aggressive or assertive behavior does not necessarily imply violent or bellicose conduct. 
Rather, a firm and unyielding policy line offers Europe the most potential in EU-Russian 
diplomacy. Several reasons validate the potential effectiveness of this approach. First, Russian 
dependence on European markets provides the European Union with important economic 
leverage. Second, cooperation , especially with organizational support, is considerably more 
effective than unilateral pressure or bilateral negotiation. Lastly, assertive diplomacy offers a 
va riety of extraneous benefi ts. 
The European Union has the potential for economic leverage because of Russian 
dependence on European markets. The majority of Russian energy is funneled into the 
E uropean Union, and 55% of Russian exports went to EU markets in 2004 (Chistokhvalova 
2003). Naturally, that percentage is only increasing. Russia's energy transit infrastructure is 
also designed largely to transport natural gas into Europe. A smaller percentage of their 
energy resources , naturally, is exported to other international markets. The infrastructure 
necessary to drastically increase that percentage simply isn't in place, nor is development 
under way. Consequently, Russia is dependent on a continued European demand. The 
Russian economy has recently been on the rise, growing steadily since the financial crisis of 
1998 (Trenin 2006, 2003). Russian economic success, however, remains relatively fragile 
because of its overdependence on the energy sector. Economic diversification is slowly 
m aterializing, but the process is, and has been, notably gradual. Global energy shocks, price 
reductions, or the loss of current market shares, consequently, all have the possibility of 
devastatingly impacting the Russian economy. Therefore, although Russia has behaved more 
aggressively because of its strengthened economic position, it simply cannot afford any 
major disruptions to its major export markets. The European Union, subsequently, retains 
important economic leverage because of the importance of its markets to Russia. This 
economic influence only persists, however, if the European Union is capable of acting in a 
unified, cohesive manner. Individual agreements and acquiescence by member states o nly 
undermine their ability to effectively induce beneficial outcomes. 
The interdependence of the Russian-EU relationship provides the European Union 
with a variety of potential diplomatic approaches. Gazprom has recently sought direct access 
to European consumers, and obtained it, to a degree, in France and Italy (Dempsey 2006, 
1). For the purpose of diplomatic pressure, the European Union could restrict further access 
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to European consumers and limit the scope of the current arrangements. The European 
Union could also threaten to increase natural gas imports from alternative global suppliers. 
Although tlus would not be a feasible means of substantively replacing Russian gas, as 
described above, it would lead to significant short-term financial losses for the Russian 
energy sector. R ecent concerns have been presented relating to the long-term potential of 
Russian gas supply (Bahgat 2006,970). Several developments are in progress that will expand 
Russia 's extraction and distribution potential, but investment in Russia's energy sector is 
woetlilly inadequate (Bahga t 2006, 97 1). The European Union could also pressure the 
Russian energy sector by restricting, impeding, or discouraging investment and future long-
term natural gas contracts. In addition, the European Union could encourage Russian 
acquiescence with carrots instead of sticks. Increased aid packages, minimized human rights 
criticisms, and wider access to European markets are all positive diplomatic incentives that 
could po tentially generate Russian compliance. In effect, the diplomatic bargaining position 
of the European Union enjoys a variety of potential benefi cial avenues. A cohesive, unified 
stance, however, is absolutely necessa ry. If Russia is capable of securing these gains or 
avoiding plllutive behavior through bilateral negotiations, then the strength of the European 
diplomatic position is lost. European cooperation is a necessary key. 
Multilateral cooperation is a m o re effective means of conducting international 
diplomacy.This multilateral effort is especially effective ifit is concentrated against one state. 
In his discussion about international cooperation and economic sanctions, D aluel Drezner, 
cOlnpares the effectiveness of unilateral, multilateral, and multilateral organizational 
economic sanctions (Drezner 2000, 73-102). H e clearly asserts the superior effi cacy of 
multilateral organizational support. Essentially, multilateral efforts of economic sanctions, 
accomplished through organizational support structures, are m ore effective than either 
unilateral or multilateral sanctions (Drezner 200, 98). T he organizatio nal base provides a 
forum for cooperation, the m eans for circumventing domestic pressures, and a medium for 
ensuring a somewhat equitable distribution of gains (Drezner 2000, 98).While the European 
Union will not likely impose economic sanctions upon Russia , nor would such a policy be 
wise, the application is clear. Multilateral efforts, especially when conducted within the 
confines of an international organization, are prone to produce m ore favorable results than 
other competing scenarios. Consequently, the European Union can most effectively pressure 
Russia and induce compliant behavior through cohesive and united multilateral efforts. 
Finally, an assertive policy stance offers the possibiliry of securing more for the 
European Union than the security and stability of energy supply. The security and stability 
of their natural gas and energy supply would, naturally, be the primary focus of diplomatic 
efforts with Russia.A cohesive and unified policy stance, however, could allow the European 
Union to pressure Russia into further concessions. Aggressive European diplomacy could 
induce the Russian Duma to sign and ratify the EU Energy C harter. Russia has resisted 
ratificatio n of the Energy C harter since its adoption in 1994. Russia has repeatedly declared 
that it is unwilling to accept the Energy Charter because of its provisions for third- party 
access to energy pipelines and deposits (Dempsey 2006, 1). During its tenure in the EU 
presidency, Germany will attempt to persuade Russia to adopt the charter. The German 
Chancellor, Angela M erkel, appears less than optimistic at the prospect of inducing a change 
in the Russian disposition . Indeed, pressuring Russia on crucial energy issues is unlikely 
unless there is widespread support and reinforcement throughout the European Union . The 
investment opportunities that access to Russian energy pipelines and deposits would afford , 
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however, would be extensive. European cooperation, consequently, would be essential to the 
success of any such venture. 
Assertive diplomacy may also be capable of inducing democratic or market reforms 
in Russia. Recent changes in Russian politics have been characterized by a decidedly neo-
authoritarian streak (Trenin 2006, 92). As Russia's economic si tuation improves and its 
energy diplomacy becomes more prevalent, it is more capable of insulating itself from 
external pressures (Trenin 2006, 94). International criticisms have, subsequently, largely fallen 
on deaf ears. Economic pressures, however, may have more influence on the Russian 
governm ent. Such a proposition is admittedly optimistic and short-term reversal of Russian 
political trends is extremely unlikely. Nevertheless, few tactics, short of military aggression, 
are Tnore persuasive than economic diplomacy. In essence, an assertive, cohesive, and unified 
diplomatic stance towards Russia offers the European Union the possibility of achieving 
more than just a stable and secure energy supply. 
OBSTACLES TO DIPLOMATIC COOPERATION 
T he propensity for effective collusion , however, is not encouraging. While an assertive 
and united policy stance would likely offer the most beneficial results to the European 
Union, implementation of such a policy is unlikely. As a scheme of regional integration and 
large-scale cooperation, the European Union is, by far, the m ost pronlinent and promising 
example in the world. Nevertheless, an inability to effectively cooperate is not new problem 
for the European Union. T heir history is rife with dilemmas and policy concerns on w hich 
the member states could not successfully compronuse. The current circumstances 
surrounding the energy security dilenuna appear to offer a sinular conclusion. Tlus appears 
to be the case for several reasons. First, the problems of energy security and stabili ty have 
varying levels of priority among European national governments. Second , cooperation on 
diplomatic and foreign policy initiatives has been a notably difficult proposition. Lastly, the 
uncertainty of the potential for cooperation prompts several states to seek bilateral solutions. 
Energy dependence and energy supply sources vary considerably among EU states. 
Consequently, energy security is a pressing issue for some nations, and a less priority for 
others. Germany imports nearly 40% of its natural gas from Russia and for several Eastern 
bloc countries, such as Poland or the Baltic States, the percentage is considerably higher 
(Gelb 2007, 2). France and Italy obtain sigluficant po rtions of their domestic gas supply, as 
mentioned above, from Gazprom and Austria is reliant o n the Russian natural gas giant for 
69% of its domestic supply (Gelb 2007, 2) . As a result, disruptions in Russian natural gas 
transit and dependence on Russian natural gas resources are a significant concern. Great 
Britain and Spain, conversely, import virtually no natural gas from Russia at all and the 
N etherlands purchases only 6% of their natural gas supply from Gazprom (Gelb 2007,2). 
For these nations, and others with comparably low percentages, the stability and security of 
Russian gas supplies is simply a less-relevant issue. The varying degree of priority for energy 
security, consequently, inhibits effective cooperation . Countries with less invested in the 
result are simply less prone to make substantial efforts than countries with comparably m ore 
at stake. This issue, consequently, weakens the potential for cohesive diplomatic cooperation. 
The issue of energy security, despite maintaining significant econonllc overtones, 
cannot be separdted from the political or foreign policy arena. The pervasive presence of 
Russia in energy disputes and the role of energy in econonuc and political stability 
necessarily make the Russian-EU energy relationship an important foreign policy issue. 
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Cooperation on. foreign policy issues has been attempted in the European Union for 
decades, with limited results. T he Maastr icht Treaty of the early 1992 created a new pillar in 
the EU structure and institutionalized the notion of a common foreign policy stance. 
European fo reign policy, however, has been highlighted by disagreements and disputes for 
the past two decades. German reunification proved to be divisive issue, especially among the 
larger E U powers (H oftinan 2000, 191). European inaction and incoherence marked the 
initial Yu goslav conflict, with Great Britain and France opposing German behavior 
(H oftillan 2000, 192) . T he recent war in Iraq also emphasized a divide in European foreign 
policy ideals am o ng G reat Britain , France, Germany, Spain, and Italy. N aturally, efforts of 
foreign policy cooperation have not all been so polarized and conflicting (Smith 2004 102). 
N evertheless, several important international events were highlighted by inconsistent 
European poli cy stances . T his history o f cooperation , or lack thereof, consequently, is not 
encouraging for European cooperation on energy securi ty. 
T he uncertainty of the European U nion 's CFSP (Conullon Foreign and Security 
Policy) and internal cooperation prompt member states to seek bilateral arrangements w ith 
Russia. T his document has already highlighted recent agreements in France and Italy with 
Gazpr011l. German cooperation with R ussia has also been significant, and several states 
continue to seek bilateral agreem ents with Russia . Wlule the potential beneti ts of a l11uted 
diplomatic effort are generally greater than individual arrangements, the uncertainty and 
unlikelihood of cohesive European cooperation causes individual states to pursue more 
probable benefits. Similar to the prisoner's dilenuna, the rational entity seeks the m ost 
certain gains rather tha n the greatest gains. Consequently, European cooperation on energy 
security issues rem ains an unlikely proposition. 
CONCLUSION 
T he European dilenuna involving the security of natural gas remains a crucial issue. 
The available options, however, all suffer from potential impediments. N evertheless, the most 
feasible and beneficial option is the forrnation of a cohesive, assertive, and unified European 
policy. While cooperative difticulties certainly hinder the potential implementation of such 
a policy, the European U nion is capable of overconung these difticulties (Snuth 2004, 131). 
Furthermore, the difficulties inherent in a cohesive policy line are considerably less than 
those presented in other strategies. R eplacing Russian natural gas imports is a difficult and 
unreasonable proposition . The prevalence of Russian gas in the European market, the nature 
of transit infrastructures, and the production potential of some supplier countries, such as 
N orway, all prevent a substitution away from Russian natural gas. T he development and 
implem entati on of alternate and renewable energy sources also succumbs to substantial 
obstacles. T he European Union's history with renewable energy initiative, collaborative 
concerns, and logistical difticulties all indicate that renewable energy sources are not the 
solution to the EU -Russian energy relationship. T he development of renewable energy 
sources is certainly a laudable effort and should be vigorously pursued. N evertheless, it 
simply cannot present itself as a solution to Russian natural gas and energy diplomacy. 
Conversely, the notion of a l11ufied European diplomatic interaction with R ussia 
offers a variety of potential benefits. Russia's corresponding dependence on European 
markets presents the European Uluon with the opportmuty to induce favorable Russian 
behavior. A unified and cohesive diplomacy, however, requires more than continued 
dialogues and new partnerships. As Russia becom es increasingly aggressive in its 
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international diplomacy and foreign policy, the European Union must respond in kind. An 
aggressive, assertive response, reinforced by a united European polity, has the potential to 
secure important benefits. European assertiveness would neutralize Russia 's confident 
energy diplomacy, and create a situation where the European Union could pressure Russia 
in certain spheres. Naturally, such a policy does not include violence or threats of military 
aggression. Instead, the strategy rests upon a unified effort and a finn, unyielding policy line. 
EU-wide cooperation is essential. Individual negotiation with Russia places many European 
states at a considerable disadvantage and allows Russia to largely impose its policy lines. 
Consequently, despite the potential hindrances, an assertive, cohesive, and unified diplomatic 
stance is the most rational , feasible, and beneficial course of action for the European Union. 
The issue of energy security will continue to grow and will continue to be a 
fundamental part of the agenda of the European Union. The energy disputes with Russia 
will not solve themselves and a resolution must be found. Energy demand and consumption 
will only continue to grow as the new century progresses and energy diplomacy by Russia 
and the Middle East will become increasingly more prevalent. As a result, it is essential that 
Europe finds a m ethod for addressing this concern. The most efiective method is an 
aggressive and unified diplomatic stance toward Russia by the European Union as a 
collective entity. Despite the potential hindrances and inherent difficulties in diplomatic 
cooperation, the diplomatic avenue remains both the most teasible and the potentially most 
beneficial course of action. Consequently, while the European Union should continue its 
efforts to promote a diverse energy mix and the use and development and renewable energy 
sources, it should emphasize the need for cohesive and collective diplomacy. Obstacles to 
cooperation have existed since the inception of the European ConU11Unity and the 
European states have demonstrated them.selves capable of overcoming those difficulties. In 
order to effectively address the current energy situation, the European Union must once 
again overcome the inherent difficulties of cooperation and form an assertive and unified 
diplomatic policy. 
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